PUDUKKOTTAI STATE

WAR INFORMATION BUREAU

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LECTURE LXVII.

HOW CAN WE BEST AID RUSSIA?

WHILE I was away from PUDUKKOTTAI for a week I heard a certain amount of arm-chair criticism of the Allies strategy at this moment of RUSSIA's trial. Like some papers at Home, these critics want to see an immediate British invasion of the Continent, in order to relieve the terrific pressure Hitler is exerting on the Soviet armies and Government. They assert from the security of their hearths that we are not doing our best by the most gallant ally we could hope to find, and that to advance the theory that Home-defence is still all-important (after the failure of Hitler's invasion-attempt last autumn) is unworthy of our fighting spirit, and of the ministerial hints of our impending 'offensive' which we have lately heard with increasing frequency.

To my listeners I will admit straight away that I opposed this attitude tooth and nail, and hope you will excuse me if I expand a little on my conversational reasons for doing so.

My first reason is more or less all-embracing, and simply is this. We, out here, even more than the critics at Home, are, technically, ignoramuses about the essentials of Continental Strategy, while

Mr. Churchill's Government's business is both to know about it, and to prevent the enemy knowing that they know about it. The very fact that Mr. Churchill, in his speeches (and most notably in his speech on September 30) has admitted the justness of the public interest in the matter, and acknowledged that "these questions have several times occurred to those responsible for the conduct of the war", but nevertheless very deliberately insisted on "the responsibility of Government to retain here at Home an ample first-class force to beat down and annihilate any invading lodgements from the sea or the air", seems to me sufficient to prove that *if* invasion of the Continent *now* were part of the soundest Continental Strategy, we should already be up and at it! It is inconceivable that a Government who took the risk of sending large quantities of tanks and men and munitions and ships to the NEAR EAST, at a time when the BRITISH ISLES were in extreme danger, would be afraid of the risk of invading the Continent now—*if it were the best thing to do.* Let us, however, take the question in greater detail. You will, I am sure, find that my case loses nothing by so doing.

First of all, one of the essentials of what I have called our 'Continental Strategy' is obviously secrecy. When our Government is girded at for not doing something, that is precisely the moment for Hitler and Goebbels to prick up their ears......Hitler's reaction to Mr. Churchill's speech made this once more clear. He was furious at having *learned* nothing. His rant about "the parliamentarians who talk and the Fuehrer who acts" was a snarl of anger at the refusal of the British War Cabinet to disclose any conclusions they had reached on the help-to-Russia topic, beyond the advertised one of enormous industrial effort. Therefore, for all he knows, and for all we know, British troops *may* already be on the Continent! Equally they may not, but the possibility has been buzzing in Hitler's brain ever since December 1940, when he flung a chest and shouted that "If BRITAIN tries to gain a foothold anywhere on the Continent she will encounter our army". The implied fear in that terrible person's mind and in the minds of thousands of Germans, has been enhanced since by the dread of what such an invasion might mean when reinforced by the hatred and longing for revenge of the tortured small nations under German occupation. May that haunting dread simmer and grow—but surely there is no need to warn the Hun when, where, and how, it is going to materialize.

Let us, however, examine and reply to the arguments of the 'invasionist' critics *seriatim*.

(*a*) Their first point is that a British invasion of the Continent would involve GERMANY on a two-war front, to neither of which could she divert her full strength. Well, do not the activities of the R. A. F. involve Germany in a war on two fronts? And is it a fact that the 'two-front war' *is* the chief bogey of the German High Command? Did not Hitler attack RUSSIA herself with this risk well-considered, and might not the attempt to disperse Hitler's strength involve a major dispersal of BRITAIN'S less numerous and (at present) less well-equipped forces?

(*b*) The critics' next point often is that by invasion we should give *the most effective aid* to RUSSIA, and avert the danger of a collapse.

Now the curious thing is that, whether or not a British invasion is on the tapis, the Russians themselves have not asked for it. They have clearly stated the kind and quantity of the aid they require, and BRITAIN and AMERICA are seeing to it that they get all they have asked for. Large scale offensive operations in the west—immediately—would reduce, if not extinguish, the possibility of supplying the Russian armies. It would increase the very danger they are at present so bravely staving off, namely, that of a military collapse.

(*c*) On the chances of gingering up the suppressed populations into effective action against their oppressors, the 'invasionists' are equally vocal. Yet would this be the actual result of the arrival of British troops on continental soil? Read accounts of the German treatment of the Poles and the Czechs, while a little physical danger to the Germans still remained after the capitulation. Do you think that Hitler and Himmler would boggle at wholesale massacre in affected zones if there were any chance of their rising in support of the British arms? And are not the prophets of immediate revolution forgetting that when those nations' armed forces failed to resist German armies, their civilians, in isolated groups and unarmed, could hardly entertain more sanguine hopes?

(*d*) Or take again the argument that the effect of a British landing would turn the depression and war-weariness in GERMANY itself into open dissatisfaction and revolution. Should we not remember

that the German collapse in the last war only took place *after four years of bitter land warfare* culminating in a big military defeat in the actual field? Is there any precedent for the expectation that the fact of an invasion would itself immediately knock the bottom out of the German war spirit, especially when every child over about six years old can remember the fate of the British Expeditionary Forces in NORWAY and BELGIUM?

(e) The last point the critics of the Government are apt to make is that some gesture is necessary to persuade the Americans that BRITAIN really means business. My answer to that is that the swing-over in American sympathy since last autumn is sufficient evidence of the U. S. A.'s conviction that exertion and sacrifice is 'at call' from the British people in every possible emergency. It will be forthcoming without stint when their leaders judge the moment opportune, and the other great democracy knows that our friendship does not depend on some spectacular combined land, sea, and air operations involving colossal risk before the time is ripe.

Dialectically, therefore you will see, the argument runs rather against invasion of the Continent than for it, even disregarding the point of cost in men and materials. The history of the British people can give no one to suppose that they would shrink from paying the cost of any endeavour likely to achieve a just object, and for all we know they may be already paying it, or preparing to pay it. Yet it behoves the impatient at least to *consider* the cost. It is an axiom—or ought to be—of military science that *if an objective is really worth while, it must be achieved regardless of cost.* Very well, is it to be hoped that with enormous hostile armies in the field against them, any force less than, say, a million men, equipped to the fullest and most modern degree, would have much chance of making the desired impression? Now, to transport a million men, (bar the comparatively small numbers that might go by air, if the journey were a short one) plus enormous quantities of tanks, guns, lorries and munitions across mine-studded seas, not less than 200 vessels of 5,000 men and 10,000 ton capacity would be required, or some two million tons of shipping. In the present state of tonnage-shortage the world over, that would be a pretty considerable demand alone, to say nothing of the necessity of naval and aerial protection in great force, which must itself interfere with the almost priceless work those two services are

performing in keeping the seaways clear for the feeding of BRITAIN, the maintenace of our great armies in the MIDDLE EAST, and the succour of the Russians themselves through their far-distant ports. It is this sort of 'cost', and not the holocaust of lives involved in landing in the face of strongly fortified enemy, with their submarines and mines and land-guns and dive-bombers, that must also be weighing with those who control our destinies. Beyond a doubt—chiefly because it is unlikely that we can win the war outright without visiting on the German armies themselves the physical defeats they are in the habit of bestowing on less powerful opponents—we shall undertake this sort of thing some day. Our leaders have promised it to us, and Hitler knows it is coming. But whether it has already begun, whether it should begin now, or whether we have to wait until the enormous start in munitions, aeroplanes, tanks and man-power which the enemy had over all the Allies combined when the war started, has been materially as well as morally wiped out, we surely ought to leave to the men we have appointed to lead us, the men who alone know what successful 'Continental Strategy' requires, and trust them to see to it that those requirements are well on the way to realisation before the enemy—or perhaps we ourselves—have much inkling of what is going on.

APPENDIX.

STRENGTH OF SOVIET INDUSTRIAL BASES IN THE EAST.

LARGE OUTPUT OF URAL, SIBERIAN AND VOLGA REGIONS.

IRON AND STEEL, COAL, OIL AND ENGINEERING INDUSTRIES.

RUSSIANS' POSITION IF THEY LOST THE NORTH CAUCASUS.

The strength of Soviet industrial bases in the East is discussed by a technical expert from the Urals in a recent issue of the Soviet Legation Bulletin in London. The writer states that about 87 per cent of the lead,

most of the zinc and nickel, and nearly 96.5 per cent of the copper extracted in the Soviet Union, is obtained in the Urals, and the adjacent district of Kazakastan.

The bulk of the country's gold, platinum, tin, tungsten, antimony and other rare metals is mined in the East. Large **aluminium** and sulphur industries have been established, and magnesium is also produced. All the potassium and asbestos consumed in the U. S. S. R. comes from the Urals.

As regards iron ore, whereas in 1929 a total of 8,000,000 tons was produced in the entire country, by the end of the Second Five Year Plan in 1937 as much as 8,200,000 tons were mined in the Soviet East alone. In the succeeding four years, the Third Five Year Plan saw a rapid growth in the extraction of iron ore in the East, and prospected iron ore reserves there are sufficient to answer the needs of the entire national economy.

"UNTOLD RICHES" IN MAGNITNAYA MOUNTAIN.

Untold riches are contained in the Magnitnaya Mountain, and the iron ores from the Baikal deposits are in no way inferior to the Swedish ores, claimed to be the best in the world, while those from Khalilove contain a number of valuable metals, such as chromium, nickel and titanium.

The large steel plants of the Urals, the bulk of which have been built in the past ten years, are scattered over a vast area from the polar north to the Steppes. The chief are the Magnitogorsk and Stalinsk plants, which rank among the world's biggest iron and steel works.

In 1937 the Soviet East (the Urals, Siberia and the Volga region) produced 6,300,000 tons of steel more than the total output of the country at the end of the first Five Year Plan. During the third Five Year Plan a number of new industrial giants have been put into operation. A plant producing ferro alloys, the largest in the country, has been erected south of the Urals.

The Urals plants—some newly built, others fundamentally reconstructed—occupy an important place in the output of high-grade steel for all branches of national economy, and a new production record has been scored since the outbreak of war. Thus the output of Magnitogorsk ore has increased nearly one and a half times.

COAL TO FEED IRON AND STEEL INDUSTRY.

Large deposits of coal, sufficient to answer the requirements of this giant iron and steel industry, are also to be found in the Soviet East. The mines of the Kuznetsk coal-fields, in Western Siberia, produce fine coking coals. Output is rapidly increasing in the Soviet Union's third largest coal centre, established a decade ago, in Karaganda, Central Asia. The recently built

railway line from Akmolinsk to Kartaly provides a direct route for Karaganda coal to the Southern Urals. The Urals are thus assured of ample supplies of coking coals for the rapid development of their iron and steel industry.

The output of coal in the Soviet East had already reached 41,000,000 tons in 1937—more than the country's total output in 1929, and almost as much as was produced in the Donetz Basin in 1933. A new coal basin has been opened in the Chkalov region and in Kazakastan.

The **Eastern U. S. S. R. also has its own oil industry.** New oil-fields in Bashkiria and Kazakastan, in the Molotov, Sverdlovsk and Kuibyshev regions, and many in other districts, are producing larger and larger quantities of oil. Even in 1938, these new oil-fields gave 5,500,000 tons of oil, which is nearly three times the total output of synthetic oil in Germany, and larger than the output of Iraq. Metal produced in the Soviet East is converted on the spot into manufactured goods essential for the front and rear.

The engineering industry, with its up-to-date equipment and skilled personnel, produces a great variety of equipment. American engineers and workers took an active part in the construction and equipment of these plants.

NORTH CAUCASIAN OIL-FIELDS.

On the assumption that the German armies advancing across the Dnieper, though failing to penetrate the Caucasus, succeed in capturing the Grozny and Maikop oil-fields in the North Caucasus, what would be the gain for Germany and loss for Russia ?

The Maikop and Grozny fields produce 5,000,000 tons annually, or about 15 per cent of the Union crude output. Refineries in the area have a crude oil capacity of some 10,000,000 tons per annum. Pipe-lines run from Grozny to Rostov, and also through Maikop to the Black Sea port of Tuapse. There is also a pipe-line from Grozny to Makhach Kala on the Caspian Sea.

It may be assumed that the Russians would blow up the oil-wells and destroy the refineries.

Modern technique in the repair of oil-wells is such that the Germans would probably extract some oil from the wells in a matter of months. Furthermore, they would start at once to drill new wells.

Crude oil as such would, however, be of little or no value unless it could be refined. It is not easy to rebuild refineries which have been thoroughly blown up. Therefore the Germans would probably run oil to Tuapse (if the pipe-lines could be repaired quickly, as presumably they could). From there it could be moved by tanker to Constanza, or through the Dardanelles and up the Adriatic to Trieste.

ONLY LIMITED QUANTITY WOULD BE AVAILABLE.

In short, the Germans would probably acquire a limited quantity within a matter of months. **This quantity might be sufficient to allow Germany to overcome temporarily her acute oil shortage.**

It would certainly not be sufficient to enable the Germans in the near future to exploit important industrial and agricultural regions falling into their hands, even supposing that they are able quickly to repair the ravages of war, and the Russian 'scorched earth' policy. The requirements of these regions in respect of lubricating oil (of which Germany is specially short), of petrol for essential lorry services and internal combustion engines, the minimum needs of the civilian population, and above all for tractors for agriculture (and there is acute scarcity of horses to act as substitutes) would be out of all proportion to the German ability to supply them from local sources, and it is hard to see where Germany would find a surplus from European sources for this purpose.

DIFFICULTIES OF TRANSPORT FROM BAKU.

The actual loss of the Maikop and Grozny fields would not in itself be very serious. But Baku oil could not be easily transported up the Caspian if German aircraft were based on Dagestan. The Baku and Batum refineries would be open to bombing as well. Hence one must assume that the main Russian armies would have to depend on the Emba and Ural fields, and those of Turkomen and other Central Asian republics. Baku oil could be used for armies in the South Caucasus and Northern Iran.

The Emba, Ural and Central Asian fields produce about 3,000,000 tons of oil per annum, but the output could be much increased without great difficulty. There are refineries at Orsk, Sterlitamak, Ufa, Saratov and Perm, where crude oil could be refined.

NO LARGE DEMANDS.

While the output of these wells seems relatively small, remember that the great industrial areas of the Ukraine and Leningrad would not be calling for oil, nor would there be the needs of the huge civil population of Western Russia to cover. This would greatly reduce ordinary consumption. Furthermore, it must be assumed that there are certain stocks of oil in the Urals and behind them. The requirements of the Far East could be covered from America, and Central Asia might receive some oil from Abadan, through the trans-Iranian railroad as well as the Caspian.

In short, the Russians could continue the struggle even if the North Caucasus were lost, but probably not on the basis of a rapid war of manoeuvre characteristic of the campaign at the moment.

WEEKLY WAR SUMMARY.

16—10—41 to 22—10—41.

The Battle for Moscow continues to be fought all along an arc extending from Kalinin in the north to Orel in the south. Mojaisk has fallen but judged from the absence of any other advance during the last three days it is obvious that the offensive has slowed down if it has not been halted altogether by Russian resistance which has been particularly effective at the extremities of the arc. If these counter-attacks are strong enough to develop into a general counter-offensive the position of the enemy who has bulged in at the centre of the arc will become precarious. The weather has also deteriorated and the enemy requires breathing time to recuperate after three weeks of savage fighting and enormous losses.

Stalin has proclaimed a state of siege in Moscow in order to safeguard the defences and keep out traitors. He has also removed the Government to Kuibishev (Samara) on the Volga 550 miles to the east of Moscow as a measure of safety. This does not mean the abandonment of the old city, which, he has declared, will be defended to the last ditch and the last man. Its defences which already resemble a steel wall are being further strengthened day and night by the whole civil population. The removal of the Government is an elementary precaution to enable the administration to continue to direct operations free from the danger and distraction of a siege. It is a proof further that the army which has been so often 'annihilated' by Dr. Goebbels is still quite intact, and that the Soviet Government far from being down hearted is going to persist in the good fight till victory is won. It is also significant that the new centre of Government is close to the Urals where new industrial centres have been set up.

The Donetz Basin.—Another drive as fierce as at Moscow has developed round Rostov, with the double object of seizing the Donetz basin and the Caucasian oil region. Stalino has fallen and the occupation of Taganrog is claimed by the enemy.

Leningrad holds its own. There is evidence that the enemy who has sustained terrific losses is losing morale. The German Ministry of Propaganda is finding excuses for the failure to take Leningrad, which

are as frivolous as they are numerous. One is that there is no hurry over the final assault on the city; a second, that as ODESSA took 60 days to fall, a longer period should be assigned to LENINGRAD. A third reason is that the Germans are averse to unnecessary loss of life, and that as the place bristle with mine-fields caution is necessary.

Odessa.—The evacuation of ODESSA which was reported in these pages last week and is now an old story is referred to again only to illustrate German mendacity and to disprove the enemy's claim to have captured it while it was simply abandoned. The fact is notorious that the Germans are not particularly successful in siege warfare. LENINGRAD still holds out, and ODESSA held on from August till last week. But as the German offensive in the Southern sector had advanced eastwards to the very bases from which ODESSA drew her supplies, and as the ODESSA garrison had carried out its initial task of holding the enemy at bay for a while, the further defence of the post had become meaningless and the defending army was consequently transferred to other centres where they were required. The evacuation went on leisurely for 8 days and in perfect order and the enemy entered the city only after the Russians had abandoned it. The Rumanian forces certainly did not take it as the result of a successful siege.

Reports are to hand that ODESSA since its occupation has been annexed to RUMANIA and made the capital of the Rumanian province of TRANSNIESTRIA.

Atlantic Outrages.—Three American vessels, including a destroyer, have been the victims of Nazi submarine attack in the Atlantic waters during the week. The American liner *Bold Venture* and the submarine *Kearney* were torpedoed south-west of ICELAND and the *Lehigh* in South Atlantic 'near the southern end of the African bulge'. The last was the worst outrage as the *Lehigh* was an empty vessel engaged in ordinary trading outside the War zone. It is suspected that the submarine which attacked it must have been refuelled either from an oil-tanker or one of the French occupied-ports. The destroyer has reached an American port in a damaged condition with 10 injured and 11 missing; the other two vessels have been sunk. Asked if the U. S. would protest on the matter Cordell Hull, U. S. Secretary, drily observed that there was no use corresponding with 'international highwaymen', and Mr. Roosevelt said 'ditto'. It is perfectly obvious that the attack

was carried out by German submarines, as part of Hitler's campaign to secure control of the Atlantic. These dastardly attacks however have proved a blessing in disguise, having occurred at the time when the American Congress is considering the revision of the Neutrality Act. They have hardened American opinion in favour of arming merchantmen and thinned the ranks of the isolationists.

The Ship-Arming Bill which has been introduced in order to revise the Neutrality Act has been passed by 259 votes to 138 by the House of Representatives and is now before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, which will close its discussion on Friday. American leaders, Mr. Wendell Wilkie and a hundred others representing all shades of public opinion, have demanded an 'outright repeal' of the Neutrality Act, which, in their opinion, had now becoming both 'hypocritical and degrading'.

Other U. S. Matters.—BRITAIN has released 15 tankers formerly taken from AMERICA, for the relief of oil shortage in the U. S. sea board.

There is every probability that Atlantic ports like HALIFAX and TORONTO will be jointly used by the U. S. and Canadian navies in the event of an attack on the Western Hemisphere.

Japan's New Cabinet.—After remaining three months in office Prince Konoye has resigned in favour of General Tojo, a pronounced imperialist. In the new Cabinet, described as a 'war cabinet', Tojo combines the offices of Premier and War Minister. His first order of the day speaks of JAPAN as standing at 'the cross-road of life and death' and his first broadcast is of the usual sabre-rattling type combined with fulsome references to the 'CHINA incident', 'co-prosperity' and Axis responsibilities.

In spite of its ominous import the cabinet change may be merely one of those visitations to which Japanese administration is periodically subject, serving as a safety valve to relieve internal political pressure. It may also be another attempt at a war of nerves to intimidate weak neighbours, or simply the result of the breakdown in the Japanese-American talks at WASHINGTON. The U. S. while perfectly willing to listen to reason is in no mood to appease or please the Japanese chauvinists. It is also likely that the recent Russian reverses have re-awakened Japanese Siberian ambitions. JAPAN may stab RUSSIA in the rear, as

ITALY did in the case of FRANCE; but RUSSIA is different from FRANCE. Again JAPAN is vexed that while her own assets have been frozen, American materials are freely carried past her very door to VLADIVOSTOK yet fearful that that if she dared attack RUSSIA in the rear BRITAIN and AMERICA would step into the Pacific arena.

Though the world's first reaction to the ministerial change in JAPAN was one of apprehension of a storm breaking in the Far Eastern sky, subsequent events have shown that hesitancy may still be the ruling feature of Japanese policy. The diplomatic talks at WASHINGTON have not ceased and the *Japan Times and Advertiser*, a pro-Government journel has written, 'the present ministry is no more military than it was before'.

Afghanistan.—As a result of friendly representations by the British and Russian Governments, AFGHANISTAN has agreed to expel all Axis nationals without diplomatic status from her territory, that is about 90 Germans and some more Italians. The Allies have promised them safe conduct to EUROPE. Thus another potential danger to INDIA has been removed. It is pleasing to note that the Afghan King in contrast to the former irresponsible Iran Government has shown such ready and statesmanlike appreciation of the situation.

GERMANY, it is reported, has threatened to retaliate by demanding the expulsion of British subjects in an unnamed territory in EUROPE on the ground that their stay near the German frontier has led to espionage.

France.—On October 20, General Holtz, the German Military Commander at NANTES was shot dead. In reprisal the Prefect of the place has been arrested and 50 hostages have been shot, to be followed by another fifty if the culprits are not discovered. Another German officer was assassinated at BORDEAUX and the occupying authorities have arrested 50 more hostages on this account.

Iran.—Having accomplished their appointed task of putting down Axis intrigue and establishing popular Government in IRAN, British and Russian forces have evacuated TEHERAN and removed to HAMADAN and the Caspian respectively.

The R. A. F.—During the week BREMEN and NAPLES were principally attacked. The latter place was subjected to a heavy raid lasting 5 hours, with heavy damage to factories, docks and railways.

War at Sea: Change of Tactics.—Finding that the sinkings in the Atlantic in July and August had declined, the enemy has resorted to new tactics. Instead of single attacks he now sends his submarines in groups and convoys are attacked in different parts of the ocean. While this calls for new methods of defence, it also affords an opportunity to deal with submarines in numbers. The British destroyer *Antelope* recently 'killed' two of these pests together.

Trafalgar Musings.—The 136th anniversary of the Battle of TRAFALGAR was celebrated on October 21 and Nelson's famous signal for every man to do his duty was flown. It is an encouragement to reflect that the navy which broke the power of Napoleon still rules the seas.

BRITISH and RUSSIAN Air Raids over ENEMY and ENEMY-occupied Territories.

Date.	Targets.	Damage caused by air bombardment.	British and Russian air losses.	Enemy aircraft losses.
13—10—41.	**(Monday.)**			
	GERMANY and GERMAN-occupied EUROPE.			
NIGHT :—				
	Military objectives at DUSSELDORF and COLOGNE. **The docks** at BOULOGNE ... **Enemy shipping** off the DUTCH and FRENCH Coasts.		5 planes.	
	ITALIAN AFRICA.			
	The harbour, railway workshops and a wireless station at BENGHAZI.	3 large ships hit.		
	The harbour and ships at TRIPOLI ...			
	SICILY.			
	The aerodrome at CASTEL VETRANO.	Explosions started.		
	MEDITERRANEAN.			
	An enemy convoy in the Central Mediterranean.		1 plane.	
	(By Russian planes).			
	EASTERN FRONT.			
	Air combats, aircraft on the aerodromes and enemy panzer troops along the whole battle field.		11 planes.	36 planes.

Date.	Targets.	Damage caused by air bombardment.	British and Russian air losses.	Enemy aircraft losses.
14—10—41. (Tuesday).				
	GERMANY and GERMAN-occupied EUROPE.			
DAY :—				
	Supply ships off the NORWEGIAN Coast.	3 vessels hit and damaged.		
	Offensive patrols over the ENGLISH CHANNEL and Northern FRANCE.			
	A goods train, an enemy patrol vessel on the French Coast.		No loss.	1 plane.
NIGHT :—				
	Military objectives in Southern GERMANY.		4 planes.	
	1 supply ship off the NORWEGIAN coast.	Sunk.		
	Another ship off the FRISIAN Islands.	Sunk.		
	ITALIAN AFRICA.			
	An enemy landing ground north of the DERNA-TOBRUK road.			
	(By Russian planes).			
	EASTERN FRONT.			
	Air combats. aircraft on the aerodromes along the whole battle area.			
15—10—41. (Wednesday.)				
	GERMANY and GERMAN-occupied EUROPE.			
DAY :—				
	Enemy shipping off the DUTCH Coast. **The docks, shipping in the harbour and quays** at LE HAVRE.		7 bombers and 1 fighter.	
NIGHT :—				
	No information available.			
	ITALIAN AFRICA.			
	The harbour at BENGHAZI.	Fires started.		
	Aerodromes at BERKA and MARTUBA.			
	Enemy stores dump south of BARDIA.			
	MEDITERRANEAN.			
	An enemy merchant ship towed by a tug off the coast of TRIPOLITANIA.		No loss.	

Date.	Targets.	Damage caused by air bombardment.	British and Russian air losses.	Enemy aircraft losses.
15—10—41.	**(Wednesday).**—*cont.*			
	(By Russian planes.)			
	EASTERN FRONT.			
	Enemy troops, Artillery and air combats along the whole battle area.		28 planes.	43 planes.
16—10—41.	**(Thursday.)**			
	GERMANY and GERMAN-occupied EUROPE.			
NIGHT :—				
	Military and Industrial objectives at DUISBURG and elsewhere in the RUHR. **The docks** at CALAIS, OSTEND and DUNKIRK. **Enemy shipping** off the NORWEGIAN coast. **Enemy shipping** off the FRISIAN Islands.	Damaged.	4 planes.	
	ITALY			
	A torpedo factory, buildings in the arsenal factory, an air frame factory, the ALFA Romeo works, docks, railways and engine sheds at NAPLES.	Very heavily damaged ; fires and explosions started.		
	ITALIAN AFRICA.			
	No information available.			
	(By Russian planes).			
	EASTERN FRONT.			
	Infantry, Artillery, air combats and aircraft on aerodromes along the whole battle sector.		17 planes.	28 planes.
17—10—41.	**(Friday).**			
	GERMANY and GERMAN-occupied EUROPE.			
	No information available.			
	SICILY.			
	The sea plane base at SYRACUSE.			1 plane.

Date.	Targets.	Damage caused by air bombardment.	British and Russian air losses.	Enemy aircraft losses.
17—10—41.	**(Friday)**—*cont.*			
	ITALIAN AFRICA.			
	The harbour at BENGHAZI.			
	Transport units on the main Coast road between ZUARA and SIRTE (in TRIPOLITANIA).	Several vehicles destroyed; others damaged.		
	The Aerodrome, barracks, buildings and, a guard house at EZ ZAUIA.			1 plane; many others damaged.
	Enemy positions south of AMBA GEORGIS.		No loss.	
	(By Russian planes).			
	EASTERN FRONT.			
	Air combats and aircraft on the aerodromes along the whole battle field.		27 planes.	52 planes.
	MEDITERRANEAN.			
	An enemy convoy in the Central MEDITERRANEAN.	2 big ships and 1 small ship hit and damaged.		
	SARDINIA.			
	The aerodrome, runaways, barracks and hangars at ELMAS.		No loss.	
18—10—41.	**(Saturday.)**			
	GERMANY and GERMAN-occupied EUROPE.			
	No information available.			
	SICILY.			
	The aerodrome runaways and aerodrome buildings at TRAPINI.	Fires started.		1 plane.
	ITALIAN AFRICA.			
	The aerodrome and aircraft dispersed on the ground at DERNA.	Many aircraft damaged.		

Date.	Targets.	Damage caused by air bombardment.	British and Russian air losses.	Enemy aircraft losses.
18—10—41.	**(Saturday)**—*cont.*			
	ITALIAN AFRICA—*cont.*			
	Landing grounds and a camp at EL GAZALA.	Damaged.		
	Shipping and harbour installations at BENGHAZI.			
	Enemy positions in the AZOZO region.			
	(By Russian Planes).			
	EASTERN FRONT.			
	Air combats along the whole battle field.		17 planes.	38 planes.
19—10—41.	**(Sunday.)**			
	GERMANY and GERMAN-occupied EUROPE.			
DAY :—				
	Radio stations, aerodromes and aircraft in the CHERBOURG area.	Damaged.	No loss.	
	Offensive patrols over the BOULOGNE and DIEPPE areas and the French Coast.			
NIGHT :—				
	No air activity.			
	ITALIAN AFRICA.			
	An enemy dump at SOLLUM ...	Blew up.		
	Enemy landing grounds in LIBYA ...	Damaged.		
	The harbour, harbour buildings and shipping at BENGHAZI.			
	SICILY.			
	A munition factory and a power house at LICATA.	Blown up.		
	The aerodrome at COMISO ...		1 plane.	
	(By Russian planes.)			
	EASTERN FRONT.			
	Artillery, Infantry, air combats and aircraft on aerodromes along the whole front.		7 planes.	23 planes.

ENEMY Air Raids over BRITAIN, BRITISH Territories and RUSSIA.

Date.	Targets.	Damage caused by air bombardment.	Enemy aircraft losses.	British and Russian air losses.
14—10—41. (Tuesday).				
	BRITAIN.			
	No information available.			
	RUSSIA.			
	Moscow.		8 planes.	
15—10—41. (Wednesday.)				
	BRITAIN.			
NIGHT :—				
	A few points in Eastern ENGLAND.	Slight damage.		
	RUSSIA.			
	Moscow.		9 planes.	
	Air combats and communications behind the Russian lines along the whole battle area.			
16—10—41. (Thursday.)				
	BRITAIN.			
NIGHT :—				
	Slight air activity on the East coast of ENGLAND.	No bombs dropped.	1 plane.	
	RUSSIA.			
	Moscow.			
17—10—41. (Friday.)				
	BRITAIN.			
	No information available as to day and night bombing.			
	RUSSIA.			
	Moscow.		14 planes.	
	Soviet troops and communications throughout the entire front.			
18—10—41. (Saturday).				
	BRITAIN.			
	No information available.			
	RUSSIA.			
	Moscow		16 planes.	
	MALTA.			
	Malta	... Very slight damage.		

Date.	Targets.	Damage caused by air bombardment.	Enemy aircraft losses.	British and Russian air losses.
19—10—41. (Sunday.)				
	BRITAIN.			
NIGHT :—				
	A few places on the East ANGLIAN Coast and elsewhere in ENGLAND.	Slight damage.	1 plane.	
	RUSSIA.			
	Moscow			
20—10—41. (Monday.)				
	BRITAIN.			
NIGHT :—				
	Several points in ENGLAND, including the MERSEYSIDE area and North WALES area.	Slight damage and a few casualties.		
	RUSSIA.			
	Moscow.			

SIDE LIGHTS.

OUTLOOK. To the Allies, winter will be an asset of some value only if the depleted resources of the Russians can be made good. It will not stop the Germans fighting, even if the fighting suffers a change in character, and unless the great efforts already being made by BRITAIN and AMERICA can be even more magnified, the predominance in equipment and striking power at present shown by the enemy is likely to continue, though their rate of progress must slow up. In order to prevent the concentration of industrial efforts by the two democracies now not involved in land fighting, Hitler is doing his utmost to push JAPAN into the war, and that he must now have hopes of success can hardly be doubted.

Strategically also there seems to be some support for our feeling that the great quadrilateral between the Caspian Sea and the Persian Gulf, and the Black Sea and the Levant, will become the main battleground for the armies of BRITAIN and the Soviet Union to challenge the Nazi hordes over the fate of civilisation. Should MOSCOW fall, and Timoshenko's armies have to fall back

the assistance probably summoned by the German centre-command from their northern and southern armies for their desperate central thrust can be re-transferred, and particularly menacing to the NEAR EAST must be the chances of a double German drive in the south.

There is no doubt that in the NEAR EAST the Allies have built, and are further strengthening, a tremendous striking force. The only handicap to this undertaking is the presence of Axis forces in LIBYA, and the Germans must be cursing and despising the Italians for their failure either to maintain their wide hold on northern AFRICA, or to control their vaunted 'mare nostrum'. Ship after ship that might reinforce Rommel goes to the bottom, time after time. British bombers strike tellingly at BENGHAZI and TRIPOLI, at Sicilian ports and Italian munition centres, and every action of this kind strengthens both the Nile Army and General Budenny in the eastern UKRAINE. Admirals Cunningham and Somerville are doing a grand job of work in the Mediterranean, the effect of which will be even more felt in the great show-down next year.

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"REPORT OF THE TRUTH". So Hitler describes his own High Command's communiqués, naively adding that he himself had had this Euphemism inserted in those communiqués! Why? Where was his need if the communiqués were demonstrably accurate? In other words, only the existence—in his own country—of widespread doubt and questioning made so public an *apologia* necessary. And is it any wonder? When, on October 3, he detailed (*Kolossally*) the Russian losses, for all his truthfulness, he made no mention of his own. Neutrals, at the same time received Russian details covering the same period, from M. Scherbakov, the Director of the MOSCOW Information Bureau. This is how they compared :—

	According to Hitler.	**According to Scherbakov.**
	Russian losses.	*Russian losses.*
Men	...Taken prisoner. 2,500,000	Killed wonded and missing 1,128,000
Guns	 22,000	8,900
Tanks	 18,000	7,000
Planes	 14,500	5,316
	German losses.	*German losses.*
Men	... ... ?	Killed and wonded 3,000,000
Guns	... ... ?	13,000
Tanks	... ... ?	11,000
Planes	... ... ?	9,000

Let us try and assess the comparative values of such widely differing figures.

We have already pointed, as has almost every Allied or neutral war bulletin, to hundreds of examples of the unblushing mendacity and gross exaggerations in German official announcements, not only since the war, but before it. The Germans probably do not mind this. They have exalted lying into a science—"the bigger the lie and the more often it is repeated, the better chance of its proving efficacious" has been an official Nazi motto.

Adding to their sins of *commisson* they commit those of *omission*. They have never published any comprehensive figures of their own losses at all, and unofficially have done their best to minimise them.

On the other hand the Russians have consistently and regularly published their losses. They have never minimised the gravity of situations; they have never been boastful or deceitful. Stalin's 'scorched earth' policy itself was a sufficiently striking example of official frankness.

On this showing, which set of figures would you prefer to believe?

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WHAT NEUTRALS THINK. But this is not the only criterion. Other tests can be applied—the estimates of neutrals, and closer examination of the Germans' own statements. Let us take the latter first. On June 23rd the German-controlled radio at BUDAPEST announced the *total strength* of the Russian Air Force as 7,000 planes. On June 30, the Italian press put it at between 6,000 and 10,000 planes. How comes it then that, while RUSSIA is still fighting grimly and successfully in the air, Hitler can claim to have destroyed 14,500 machines? !

So much for planes. Now for men. On September 22, Lord Haw-Haw declared that the total German losses in killed, wounded and prisoners were *under half a million*, while Russian losses were 4,000,000—two million killed and two million prisoners. The wounded are not mentioned. Now, on the German ratio of *three men wounded for one killed*, the *total* Russian losses would be about 10,000,000 men, or twenty Russians for one German! Does it make sense? Even the latest Russian statistics, which might at least be excused a favourable bias, only claim that for each Russian casualty there have been three Germans—1,100,000 Russian *casualties* to 3,000,000 Germans.

Now for the second check—neutral statistics. Messrs. Lazaroff and Root, two American observers noted for their accuracy, estimated German losses up to July 11th, at nearly a million men. Ten weeks later, the CHICAGO *Daily Telegraph's* correspondent in EUROPE, made a set of figures based on the *obituary notices appearing over one week, in one town*, HAMBURG. The names of 67 officers and N. C. O.'s appeared. These ranks generally form 15% of the total losses, which would give HAMBURG 1,000 further deaths in that one week.

Going further, on the basis of the population ratio, 86,000 Germans were killed on the Russian front in that week. On this basis, in the fifteen weeks of the battle the Germans had lost 1,300,000 men killed, which, on the same calculation as above of three wounded to one killed, gives a total of German casualties of 3,900,000. Why, it makes the Russian claims look positively modest !

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WHEN WINTER COMES. In his latest speech, Hitler made the illuminating remark (about the Russian battle) that "there exists only the transport problem". On September 29, the German home broadcast talked a lot about roads being like water-logged ploughed fields which could no longer absorb the heavy rain.

Judging from temperature charts, similar conditions can be expected to obtain in the CRIMEA and DONETZ basin until the middle of November. Then the temperature drops; the frost comes; the mud hardens; and the Germans will set their thousands of prisoners to constructing solid tracks over the hard snow. That is why we recently warned our readers that hard weather in RUSSIA would not necessarily mean the cessation of fighting, or the end of the German advance eastwards.

But......! There are two other aspects of winter which will worry the Germans far more than the Russians. The first concerns Oil. The vaporisation of petrol in low temperatures is always troublesome. Down to 25 degrees of frost the addition of natural gasolene makes petrol just workable. Below that, it is doubtful whether petrol *can* be treated to function properly, and—in the SMOLENSK and LENINGRAD regions at any rate—Russian temperatures drop to 75 degrees of frost !

Lubricating oil is even more difficult to adapt. The lower the temperature, the thinner the oil must be, and the thinner the oil, the more likely the engine is to seize. Both sides will have to think this out, but the Germans have the longer mechanized journeys to make.

The other factor is the physical test. In the Russian winter the strain on physical endurance will be terrible. Intense cold in still air is hard enough to bear; prolonged exposure to the northerly winds sweeping across plains of snow and ice is almost intolerable. Soviet troops, more inured to such rigours, will have the advantage of the Germans; they are actually practising specialised troops for winter warfare in SIBERIA now.

Warm clothing thus becomes an important factor—and the Germans must be pondering this anxiously. Before the war they imported 70% of their wool

and 80% of that is now cut off by the British blockade. On the other hand the Russians have 80% of their wool and practically all their resources in furs well behind the fighting-line.

No wonder the Greek Prime Minister could recently report in LONDON that when the Hun armies arrived in GREECE, they immediately ransacked the underclothing shops, taking even women's woollen underwear !

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THE ARTS OF WAR IN PUDUKKOTTAI. In spite of rather threatening weather, there was a very good crowd to see the MADRAS District's Military Circus on the 21st evening. Between six and eight thousand people were given a well-designed and carefully explained exhibition of the use of the weapons and tools of modern warfare, —armoured cars, Bren and Tommy guns, pneumatic drills and saws and pumps, boats and bridges and land-mines and the like. They also saw instructive front-line infantry work carried out briskly and entertainingly by Madras Infantry and Madras Sappers and Miners. If the efficiency of these Tamil units, with their steel helmets, gas-masks and cloaks, their physique, discipline, and cheerful intelligence, does not inspire some of the young Tamils who watched them to emulate their example and do a job of work for their homes, for INDIA and for the Empire, then one feels that little short of an enemy bomb in SANDAIPETTA will really wake PUDUKKOTTAI up to the reality and proximity of war. As a Recruiting Officer remarked, " War is a filthy thing. Why wait for it, when, by joining up, you can help to keep it away ? "

Mr. CHURCHILL'S REFERENCE TO NAZIS' SHORTAGE IN THE AIR.

LACK OF EFFICIENT PILOTS PROBABLY MEANT.

STATEMENT ABOUT BRITISH ARMY EXPLAINED.

When Mr. Churchill spoke of Germany's " serious shortage in the air," he was thinking mainly of pilots, observes the *Manchester Guardian* Political Correspondent on October 2. This shortage of pilots should not be exaggerated, Germany's numerical superiority over us is still formidably large, and, if pushed, she could concentrate a troublesome number of planes against us at this moment, in spite of all her Russian commitments, and still more, of course, if the Russian front became stabilised. German losses in the air in Russia are

partly explained by the fact that the Germans, in order to obtain air superiority at some vital parts of the front, deliberately accepted inferiority with inevitable casualties at other points.

The House of Commons was not quite clear about another statement of Mr. Churchill's. He said that the army would not be increased. What he meant was that the number of divisions would not be increased. It is a number agreed upon by the War Cabinet long ago as being required by the needs of its strategical plans. This does not mean that the army will not require more men. There is a wastage of 100,000 to 200,000 men which has to be made good. Recruiting for this wastage is being mainly met from the youngest age groups, deferred call-ups and the release of men by women in certain branches of the services, notably the anti-aircraft branch, where women are actually to replace gunners. The firing of an A. A. gun is an automatic business like the tapping of a typewriter, and women are now being trained for the work. However, this operation, entirely mechanical as it is, will for the first time put women into the combatant ranks of the British army.

WHY LOSSES IN PERSONNEL ARE SERIOUS.

In his review of the war situation, Mr. Churchill spoke of the enemy's strength in the air, and stated that the Nazis' only shortage is in fact in the air, writes the *Manchester Guardian* Aeronautical Correspondent. That is a very serious shortage, said the Prime Minister, but whether this shortage concerns men or aircraft, or both, he did not reveal.

Losses in personnel would be more serious for the *Luftwaffe*, for while replacement of aircraft can be accelerated, training of new pilots and air crews for modern operational duties cannot be speeded up, without increasing the rate of accidents to a serious extent during the instructional period. Hastened training also means deterioration in efficiency and spirit.

Up to the present, training in the Russian air force, according to all reports, has been of a very high order and equal to that of the R. A. F. On the other hand, it was found that many of the German aircraft shot down on the eastern front during the last few weeks were flown by unskilled and hurriedly trained youths about 18. Several incidents reported by our fighter pilots on their return from offensive sweeps lately suggest that there is a falling-off in the capabilities of Nazi airmen, and this tends to confirm Russian reports.

This fact, and a study of the tremendous German air losses in two years of war, leads one to assume that the Prime Minister's reference to the enemy's very serious shortage means that Germany is finding it difficult to maintain some *Luftwaffe* squadrons at their former strength and efficiency.

THE *NELSON* AS PART OF THE GIBRALTAR SQUADRON.

FORMIDABLE ADDITION TO FORCE'S FIRE-POWER.

WHY TORPEDO-BOMBERS FALL EASY VICTIMS TO A. A. GUNS.

Further information given by the First Lord of the Admiralty, about the Italian attack on a military convoy in the Mediterranean, disclosed that the warship which was slightly damaged by a torpedo hit in the course of the operation was the battleship *Nelson*, writes the *Manchester Guardian* Naval Correspondent on October 1. It had not previously been publicly known that this ship has been detached from the Home Fleet and sent for service overseas. The addition of such a vessel to Admiral Somerville's Western Mediterranean Squadron adds considerably to the fire-power of his force, for a *Nelson* broad sideis much heavier than one of the *Hood* and the other battle cruisers, that have been mentioned from time to time as forming the backbone of the Gibraltar Squadron.

It might seem at first sight that the naval A. A. gunners on this occasion were exceptionally accurate, since they brought down seven of the 13 enemy aircraft destroyed during the attacks. The fact that six of their victims were torpedo-bombers must be noted, however. Machines have to dive to within 50 feet of the water or less before dropping their torpedoes, and they must be within half a mile of the target ship to be successful. The hail of explosive shells that can be plastered around the area of the bottom of the dive is murderous with the multiple pom-poms now carried by big ships.

Indeed, it is still one of the mysteries of the Battle of Taranto that only two out of 11 British dive-bombers in that action were shot down, for they had approached the targets within a few hundred yards in the confined space of the harbour, which was packed with A. A. guns of all kinds.

"V" FOR VYNOSLIVOST!

"Stalin must be sustained."

—BEAVERBROOK.

THE RUSSIANS HAVE A WORD FOR IT.

Sir Bernard Pares writes in a recently published book :—

"There is a fine Russian word for a fine Russian quality—*vynoslivost*, lasting a thing out,' and it applies not only to the man but to the nation, not only to the body, but the mind."

It is this fine quality that is showing itself now round Vyasma and north of Briansk and Orel, where Soviet soldiers are putting every ounce of their strength, every scintilla of their spirit, into the defence of Moscow—150 Kilometres in their rear.

Hitler must look in vain for any sign of a crack appearing in the firm facade of Russian morale. The 14,000 tanks he has thrown into the present battle have not scared the Russians, nor can all Goering's dive-bombers and parachutists shake their spirit. Like the people of Britain, they can take all Hitler has to hurl against them and still stand firm, eager to hit back hard when their turn comes.

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Pravda's phrase, "The danger is great and threatening," means just what it says. It certainly does not mean, as such phrases did during the French campaign, that all is nearly lost. There is no military reason why resistance should not be continued, even if Moscow fell. **The Soviet Government has been noted for the frankness of its admissions and the sharpness of its self-criticisms.** Stalin's speech in July provides an example of the first; the second is exemplified by the severe criticism of Russia's transport facilities, at a conference held only a few months before the German invasion.

In practice, the Russians have been better than their word, not only in the matter of transport, but also in the efficiency of their Airforce, Navy, Tank forces and mechanised Infantry. **Hitler himself has had to admit his colossal error in underestimating Russian strength and Russian powers of endurance.**

THE R.A.F. IN ACTION ON THE ARCTIC FRONT.
EFFECT ON FINNISH HIGH COMMAND.
GREAT BATTLE FOR DONETZ BASIN IN SIGHT.
WHAT LOSS OF AREA WOULD MEAN TO RUSSIANS.

by

Ossian Goulding

(*In a cable from Stockholm to the* ***Daily Telegraph***).

THE R. A. F. is in action on the Arctic front. Information reaching me here from high Finnish military sources reveals that Hurricane fighters have played a decisive part in smashing the latest German offensive on Murmansk. They have pushed the Nazis once more behind the line of the Litsa

river, which runs 35 miles west of the town just short of the Finnish frontier and flows into the Arctic. Other R. A. F. planes have flown southwards, with intermediate halts in Russian Karelia, to take part in the desperate air battles now raging over the house-tops of defiant Leningrad.

The official Air Ministry announcement of a seven-to-one victory in the first engagement of the R. A. F. in Russia has made a profound impression on the Finnish High Command. It has emphasised strikingly for the Finns the lesson learned on the Western Front last year—the complete superiority of the R. A. F. over the *Luftwaffe*, man for man and machine for machine. It has also come as a timely reminder that, if Finland chooses to disregard the British Government's solemn warning against continuing the war beyond her old frontiers, Britain possesses sufficient force at Finland's land and sea frontiers to support her words with deeds.

SURPRISE FOR GERMANS.

The appearance of the R. A. F.'s multi-gun fighters on the Murmansk front was probably the biggest and most unpleasant surprise the Nazis have suffered for many weeks. When German troops, which included Austrians, advanced to attack, some days ago after forcing passage of the Litsa river, they threw in first, in accordance with the usual Nazi tactics, a strong force of Junkers dive-bombers, to blast the Russisn positions. These were met over the river by our Hurricane patrols, and promptly turned tail escaping under cover of the morning mist. The German attack was held up, while Nazi fighter squadrons of Messerschmitt-109s were summoned from Petsamo, in Finland, and Kirkenes, in Northern Norway, to deal with this unexpected menace. The results of the meeting are already known.

The two forces clashed in severe weather conditions on a cold misty morning. After a series of wheeling dog-fights over the desolate wastes of the tundras, now powdered with their first fine covering snow, the Germans made off, leaving our men masters of the air. Deprived of their air support, the Nazis were thrown on the defensive. After a few days of reorganisation, the Russians themselves advanced to attack. The latest news from reliable Russian sources reveals that this attack has now successfully concluded. The Nazis were driven back across the Litsa river for a distance of more than ten miles, before they succeeded in re-establishing their front.

The arrival of the R. A. F. wing, and its latest field operations, have been one of the best-kept secrets of the war. Nazi official quarters, although they now know fully the facts surrounding its arrival and transport, have not dared hitherto to publish these for two reasons. First, they fear the effect of the news on Finnish public spirit. Secondly, all news of reinforcements for Russia is indigestible as propaganda for the war-weary German public.

Von Rundstedt is preparing to launch another gigantic and dangerous offensive in the Eastern Ukraine. This may prove to be the greatest battle of the Russian war hitherto—the battle for the Donetz basin. Búdenny's main armies have escaped from Kiev. Though that fact is not yet accepted officially in London, Russian circles here are less reserved. They estimate that the Cossack Marshal has extricated three-quarters of his total force between Kiev and Kremenchug and successfully consolidated the front just east of Poltava, losing approximately 200,000 men in the process. At Poltava he flung in reserves in a counter-attack, which checked the Nazi pursuit long enough to allow his weary shattered divisions to regroup farther back along the Poltava-Kharkov railway about 50 miles west of Valki. From these positions he has been slowly forced back till his front line is now 35 miles west of Kharkov.

RUNDSTEDT'S LIKELY PLAN OF ATTACK.

Against this line von Rundstedt is now preparing to launch his drive against the industrial heart of the Eastern Ukraine—Kharkov itself. The attack is likely to take the by now familiar form of a pincer movement. The Panzer divisions will batter their way north and south of the city for the infantry armies of von Reichenau gradually surrounding the city. A final assault in force will then be delivered at the weakest point. At the same time von Rundstedt's southern force is beginning a new advance from Genichesk along the coast of the Sea of Azov against Mariupol and Stalin, preventing Budenny from detaching reinforcements from this sector to meet the threat to Kharkov. Hitherto this attack has not been reported as meeting with great success.

The battle for Kharkov will be grim and dour. Budenny's armies, though weakened, are not broken, and are capable of terrific resistance, backed by the fully mobilised civil population of 800,000, who have been preparing fortifications ceaselessly for the past two months. In addition, big Soviet reserves have been held back at Kharkov and other big Donetz centres against such an emergency. The Soviet air force here is numerically not far inferior to the *Luftwaffe*, according to Moscow statements.

GUERILLA ACTIVITY.

Guerilla activity behind the German lines also continues to have more weakening effect the farther they go. The Nazis have now exhausted their accumulated stores and ammunition, and are depending on day-to-day production.

Against that we must set the fact that Hitler is determined to capture the industries of the Donetz before winter, so that in the Germans' own words, Russia and not Germany feels the full severity of the winter war.

The Nazi military machine is still strong enough to launch and maintain an offensive equal to all the previous ones. Above all, the Nazis have great superiority in tanks. In our own interests we must abandon our mood of easy optimism, and face the stern reality that Russia may lose the great Donetz area before Christmas. That does not mean to say that it will be an easy Nazi victory, for the Russians will put up a terrific resistance and destroy all behind them.

HOW CAN LOSS BE REPLACED?

But the loss will be severe. Kharkov alone has two plane factories, tank factories, an army training school, gigantic tractor works—the biggest in the Soviet Union—machine-tool and engineering plants and huge turbo generators. Besides this are the anthracite of Shakhti, the coal mines of Lugansk and Stalin, the great chemical industry of Stalin, the salt of Artemovsk, the chemical and graphite industries of Slaviansk, and the great harbour and industrial centre of Rostov. It will take weeks for the Germans to conquer all that, and their casualties in achieving it may be tremendous. But, if those industries are lost to Russia, they will have to be replaced by Britain and America. We must consider now how to replace them. The time to prepare is before the battle, not afterwards.

WHAT IS GERMANY'S "NEW ORDER"? EXPERIENCE OF THE OCCUPIED COUNTRIES. HOW REICH "TRADES" WITH VASSAL STATES. NAZI ECONOMICS AT WORK.

by

Noel Barber.

[We have been recently watching the course of Trade negotiations between Germany and Turkey. The failure of Dr. Clodius shows that one country, at least, seems to hold the views expressed in this article. Ed.]

For more than a year Germany has been in control of a large part of Europe. She has been in a position to realise her "new order" at any time. In fact, it is being realised by the systematic despoiling and looting of the occupied countries, by the deliberate starvation of the Greeks and by the perversion to purely German ends of the economies of other countries.

Throughout Europe people now know the truth. After years of bitter and ruthless tutelage, and grandiloquent blowing of his own trumpet by Goebbels, it is revealed as nothing more than a shoddy fanfare on a tin whistle. Under

the "new order" the German people are promised a higher standard of living and enjoyment, rationally planned production over the whole of Europe, whose markets will be exploited to take the industrial products of Germany, its sole supplier.

Berlin will become Europe's financial centre instead of London. The German people will find a place in the African sun.

To the people of the occupied countries the emphasis is different. The great benefits which they will enjoy—should indeed be enjoying already, since the new order has been running for some time—are mainly the total abolition of unemployment, and the sale to Germany of their agricultural surplus—for Germany would "persuade" the occupied countries to develop agriculture—leaving industry to the Germans themselves.

"Surplus agriculture" indicates that there is enough for the people first. But is there? No, because the Germans, anxious to show the German people the "new order's" working in Germany, are grabbing everything they can, without a thought for the future.

One thing is certain. After two years of war, the people of Europe know the shams and delusions and the cheap tricks which are covering up the bold bluffs of the Nazi propaganda factory. The lack of food gives no stomach for promises. Ths lack of clothes soon reveals stark discrepancies.

When you boil it down, the New Order turns out to be nothing more than the economic expression of Nazi political theories, and an attempt to make the Nazi war aims respectable.

Germany plans to be the master of the world—every other country must serve her. She sees France—and decides that France shall in future be the granary of Europe. She sees Denmark—and decides that it will be their dairy. In exchange, Germany offers to provide France and Denmark with machinery and industrial goods, but after a year this is just exactly what the Germans are not doing.

The clearing agreement is an instrument of barter trade, in which the ideal is that each country should send goods of exactly the same value to the other—in other words, the "swopping" of things they do not want, so that each is satisfied. When one country exports more than it imports, debits or credits accumulate on the clearing account, and in free normal times the country which is owed money either gets that in cash, or stops sending anything to her neighbour, until the debtor country has wiped off the amount by sending further goods.

How does that apply to Denmark, where the Nazis have made a great show of their efforts to keep up an appearance of normal trade, which is indeed the shop-window of the Nazis' "new order"? After the first eight months of

German occupation, the Danes had a credit balance of over 400,000,000 kroner in Berlin, which they have no hope of collecting. And that does not represent the full extent of exploitation, because you must add to this figure the costs of German occupation, which are covered by credits of the Danish National Bank.

Denmark cannot says, halt, to the Germans. She has no freedom. She has to do what she is told. Moreover, the Danes have no choice in the goods they can import in return, if they get any in return. The Germans do export one thing to Denmark in this way—inflation.

Because they cannot pay, they flood Denmark with cheap paper money, to keep up an appearance of stability at home. This is the same in other countries. In France the fixing of the higher exchange rate for the mark makes it simple for the Germans to buy French goods, while the occupation costs of 400,000,000 francs daily pay for a great deal of what the Germans take, besides providing them with Erench money for buying shares in French concerns.

In Yugoslavia a similar effect is produced by the enforced payment to Germany of the old Serbian debts, dating from before the last war.

The golden age which Germany promises to the world is nothing but a cheap bluff by a poker player, who holds no cards but has a loaded revolver on the table.

If it came to a Nazi victory, the present German system would be intensified a hundredfold. Germany would take whatever she needed, leaving a starvation allowance to the occupied countries. People would have to do what they were told—and it certainly takes the gilt off the golden age if a brilliant engineer has to plough the fields, or a mathematician to clean the pig-sties, so that the German waistband may be let out another hole. Be sure that the occupied countries know by now what vast miseries this "new order" promises.

HOW LONG WILL IT LAST?
TEN YEARS, SAYS ITALIAN LEADER.
A TURKISH COMMENTARY.

by

Abidin Daver *(In the "Cumhuriyet", Istanbul)*

It seems that the Italian Minister of Education wrote in one of the Italian papers that "the war may go on for ten years, and the Italian populace should be made to understand this." By saying this the Minister is supposed to be trying to persuade the Italians to anticipate a lengthy war. Count Ciano's paper seems to be of the same opinion.

How long will this war continue? Will it really continue for ten years, as the Italian Minister seems to foresee? It is impossible to say. Recently Lord Halifax also talked of preparing for a 20 years' war, but Lord Halifax wished to say that Britain would fight this war to its ultimate end, even if it were to continue for 20 years—showing by his statement the determination and perseverance of the British people.

Those who are now trying to prepare the Italians for a 10 years' war, were last year the persons who had foreseen a victory in the summer of 1941. Those were the people who were to conquer Egypt—thus closing the Suez Canal, blockading Gibraltar, conquering Malta and, by turning the Mediterranean Sea into an Italian Lake, to realise the historic conception of "Mare Nostrum", and also sweep the British out of Africa. From June 10th 1940, when Italy declared war, to December 9th 1940, when the British attacked Libya, Italian papers and radio broadcasts always referred to bloodless war and an easy near-by victory.

In those days, Italian literature had prepared the Italian nation "for a victory without fighting." Now that they have been in the war for 14½ months, they are talking of getting ready for a 10 years' war. What can be the reason for going from one extreme to the other? Leave alone the impossibility of foreseeing the length of the war—even through mathematical calculations—it is even impossible to arrive at an approximate conclusion on the point, why are the Italian statesmen talking of a 10 years' war? If this is to frighten their opponents, they should be aware of the fact that by such statements they satisfy the British, instead of disappointing them, as the British war plans and their possibilities of victory are mostly based on a long war of attrition. As it is, the British character being phlegmatic, patient and stubborn, is suitable for this sort of warfare. The British are not as fiery and as hasty as the Italians and the French. They do not flare up and then fade away as suddenly and as quickly as hay-fire. Therefore, by stating that the war is to continue for 10 years, it would be impossible to disappoint their hopes and break their morale. This prophecy is good news for the British, not for the Italians.

By stating that the war may continue for 10 years, it is evident that the Italians have completely lost hope of ever winning the war easily and by a quick victory. Since 1912 Italy is the nation which has been at war more than any other nation. With Turkey, then Tripoli, the Great War, again war with Libya, war with Abyssinia, participation in the Spanish civil war, and lastly this second World War. These wars are certain to have tired Italy. And the possibility of this war continuing for 10 years is certainly not going to please even the strongest-nerved Italians.

THE AXIS SPEAKS—AND IS ANSWERED.

A Commentary on Enemy Broadcasts to India and the Near East.

For the period October 8—15, 1941.

AUSTRALIA AND THE AXIS

" Labour disapproves of the Government's policy of giving unqualified aid to Britain in the prosecution of the war." (*German news in Persian and Arabic, October 6. German and Italian news in Englsh, October 7.*)

Nothing could be more pitiful than the manner in which the Axis has tried to make political capital out of Australia's internal affairs.

Here is what Mr. Curtin, the Federal Premier, said on Oct. 8: "Australia wants to maintain British justice and British law, and knows she cannot maintain them unless we wage war with all our effort. I wish always to be able to say that the Australian people gave all their resources in this war as a gift of free men and women to a Government, toward the accomplishment of victory."

The whole cabinet consists of men who have distinguished themselves in one way or another connected with the war effort. Mr. Forde, the Deputy Leader of the Labour Party, said on Oct. 4: "Australia under Labour will be able to play her part honourably and effectively as an integral membar of the British Commonwealth."

DEEP IMPRESSIONS.

"The Fuehrer's speech has made a deep impression abroad." (*German news in Hindustani, Octobr, 6.*)

"Hitler is obviously entertaining an unoptimistic view concerning the developments of the war. The Fuehrer frankly admitted that Russia is developing into an arsenal despite the tremendous German victories." (*Japanese paper "Yomiupi" on the Fuehrer's speech.*)

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"Rotterdam was raided by the British Air Force on October 5. Only residential quarters were bombed and the indignation of the Dutch people is mounting." (*German news in English, October 7.*)

The indignation of the Dutch people is mounting, but against whom? They have already shown their attitude towards Britain. During the R. A. F. raids in July the people of Holland came out into the streets and waved to the pilots to help them to attack military targets more effectively. The Quisling Government had to issue orders against such demonstrations, but they still go on.

WHAT GOEBBELS SAID IN 1940.

Plenty.

"The excellent wheat harvest in France has not been damaged by the war. For the first time in modern history, Poland, a very fertile grain producer, has been the object of an intensive German cultivation. These two facts with the plentiful supplies of Germany, constitute a convincing refutation of all those unsubstantial rumours about scarcity of foodstuffs in Europe."—*German Broadcast in English, July 17, 1940.*

Scarcity.

"Britain wants to starve the populations of French territories, because famine has often spelt the beginning of revolutions."—*German Broadcast in French, August 15, 1940.*

"Harvesting in Europe has just begun, and leaves no doubt that it is satisfactory. Germany is completely independent of this year's crops having stored away vast reserves of grain for this year and next year."—*German Broadcast in English, August 4, 1940.*

"Starvation in Europe, and especially of the German people, can be considered to-day as only a monster of the British imagination. General Starvation, the last ally of Britain, disappeared before the war from the ranks of the living. To-day nearly all foodstuffs are lacking in England, and the situation becomes worse day by day."—*German Broadcast to Hungary June 28, 1940.*

"If England refuses to let food supplies pass through to the peoples of occupied areas, these prople should not beg Germany to relieve their hunger; they should apply to the British."—*German Broadcast in Dutch August 9, 1940.*

"If Britain gives up the idea of this blockade, serious food shortage could be avoided, and without providing the least assistance to Germany herself."—*German Broadcast to Brazil, August 10, 1940.*

WHAT GOEBBELS SAYS IN 1941.

Plenty.

"The prospects of a good harvest in most European countries are very good."—*German Broadcast in English, July 1, 1941.*

"The grain crop of 1941 will be much better than that of previous years."—*German Trans-Ocean News Agency, August 1, 1941.*

Scarcity.

"The weather has been unsuitable for harvesting. Grains, potatoes and vegetables have to a large extent not yet been brought in. The situation is serious."—*German-controlled Norwegian Radio, September 12, 1941.*

"This year there are farmers who would not hear, see or speak of the grain harvest. Certainly this year's harvest has not turned out in the way to which we have been accustomed."—*German Broadcast in German, August 25, 1941.*

Dr. Darré has told us that German **harvest are good** and yet :

Why were 700,000 tons of bread grain taken from Poland in 1940 ?
1,500,000 pigs, 7,000,000 hens, 150,000 cows taken from Denmark ?
200 tons of fish daily, and 20,000 tons of sugar taken from Norway ?
90 per cent of her reserves of butter and 43,000 tons of potatoes taken from the Netherlands ?

Because :

Fats can be turned into **glycerine for explosives.**

Starch can be used for the production of **alcohol acetone and glycerine.**

Sugar and Sugar beet are readily convertible into **alcohol.**

PROGRAMME OF LECTURES

OF THE

Pudukkottai State War Information Bureau.

1941— **LECTURE LXVII**—(*Batch 4*).

October ...25,	Saturday ...	Town Hall ...	6.30 p. m.
26,	Sunday ...	Muslim Association, Pudukkottai.	5.30 p. m.
		Nirpalani ...	6.00 p. m.
		Avoor ...	6.30 p. m.
27,	Monday ...	Andakkulam ...	6.00 p. m.
		Killanur ...	6.30 p. m.
28,	Tuesday ...	College (A) English ...	10.15 a. m.
		Karaiyur ...	6.00 p. m.
		Keelathaniam ...	6.30 p. m.
29,	Wednesday	C. S. M. High School ...	10.00 a. m.
		Rani's High School ...	10.15 a. m.
		College (B) Tamil ...	10.15 a. m.
		Narthamalai ...	6.00 p. m.
		Uppiliakkudi ...	6.30 p. m.
30,	Thursday ...	Semmattividuthi ...	6.00 p. m.
		Malayur ...	6.30 p. m.
31,	Friday ...	Puduppatti (Ponnamaravathi).	6.00 p. m.
		Vendampatti ...	6.30 p. m.

LECTURE LXVIII—(*Batch 5*).

November... 1,	Saturday ...	Town Hall ...	6.30 p. m.
2,	Sunday ...	Alangudi ...	6.00 p. m.
		Rasiamangalam ...	6.30 p. m.
3,	Monday ...	Vellanur ...	6.00 p. m.
		Puthambur ...	6.30 p. m.
4,	Tuesday ...	College (A) English ...	10.15 a. m.
		Thiruvarangulam ...	6.00 p. m.
		Vamban ...	6.30 p. m.
5,	Wednesday.	C. S. M. High School ...	10.00 a. m.
		College (B) Tamil ...	10.15 a. m.
		Rani's High School ...	10.15 a. m.
		Cheri School ...	5.30 p. m.
		Piliyur ...	6.00 p. m.
		Kannangudi ...	6.30 p. m.
6,	Thursday ...	Melur ...	6.00 p. m.
		Pillamangalam ...	6.30 p. m.
7,	Friday ...	Kolavoipatti ...	6.00 p. m.
		Kilayur (South) ...	6.30 p. m.

IMPORTANT NOTICE

A

Well-known War Film

Prepared by

The British Government

Entitled

'LOFOTEN ISLANDS'

(Tamil version)

will be shown at the

VEST TALKIES, PUDUKKOTTAI

From October 27, for 4 days

The War Information Bureau warmly recommends it to the Public.

Sri Brihadamba State Press, Pudukkottai. 1,000—25-10-41.